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Abstract
Performability relates the performance (throughput) and reliability of software systems whose
normal behaviour may degrade due to the existence of faults. These systems, naturally mod-
elled as Discrete Event Systems (DES) using shared resources, can incorporate Fault-Tolerant
(FT) techniques to mitigate such a degradation. In this paper, compositional FT models based
on Petri nets that make its sensitive performability analysis easier are proposed. Besides, two
methods to compensate existence of faults are provided: an iterative algorithm to compute
the number of extra resources needed, and an Integer-Linear Programming Problem (ILPP)
that minimises the cost of incrementing resources and/or decrementing FT activities. The
applicability of the developed methods is shown on a Petri net that models a secure database
system.
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1 Introduction1
Performability [1] evaluates the performance (throughput) and the reliability of degradable systems,2
i.e., systems whose provided services may suffer some degradation due to errors and failures. Nor-3
mally, degradable systems include Fault-Tolerant (FT) techniques [2, 3] that provide mechanisms4
to deal with failures inside the system and mitigate the consequences of faults. Some examples of5
FT techniques are: switching system requests between non-faulty components, adding watch-dogs6
for checking liveness of system components, or software exception handlers. A degradable system7
equipped with a FT technique is called a FT system.8
Many FT systems are complex systems using shared resources that are compromised (i.e.,9
they fail) by the activation of faults. These systems can be naturally modelled as Discrete Event10
Systems (DES) where resources are shared, also called Resource Allocation Systems (RAS) [4].11
In this paper, we focus on FT systems using shared resources modelled as Petri nets (PNs) –12
more precisely, as process Petri nets [5]. This kind of PNs allows to model different instances13
of a single process that use shared resources (then competing among them) to complete. An14
extension of process Petri nets called S4PR [5] can be used for modelling resource competition15
among structurally different processes.16
Many studies evaluate the performability of a FT system through analytical models, usually17
represented as Markov processes [6,7]. These studies consider the FT systems modelled ad-hoc, and18
they do not provide any solution to mitigate the impact of activation of faults into the FT system.19
An evaluation of performability using Petri net-based models is presented in [8, 9]. Stochastic20
Activity Networks (SANs) are used in [8], associating reward rates directly with the markings of21
designated places and reward impulses with the completion of activities. Such an idea is extended22
for Generalised Stochastic Petri nets (GSPNs) by Bobbio in [9]. Another work that uses GSPN23
formalism is [10], where an extension of Fault Tree Analysis called Repairable Fault Trees (RFT)24
is presented. This extension allows the modelling and analysis of the repairing process by means25
of GSPNs.26
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A more recent approach is given by Reussner et al. in [11], where a compositional approach27
is presented using Markov chains as modelling formalism. Other works [12, 13] in the literature28
study the impact of error propagation on reliability, also focused on component-based systems.29
Resource optimisation and its usage have been already studied for some class of Petri nets,30
namely Workflow Petri nets [14] or variants [15–17]. The work in [14] performs reduction operations31
on the original WF-net, having exponential complexity in the worst case. In [15], a method based32
on the reachability graph is presented. However, such a method can suffer scalability problems if33
the workflow size is large. Van Hee et al. give in [16] an algorithm to compute optimal resource34
allocation in stochastic WF-nets. Such an algorithm suffers as well from scalability problems35
because its complexity depends on the number of resources. In [17], Resource Assignment Petri36
Net (RAPN) is presented, that allows to define how resources are shared and assigned among37
different and concurrent project activities. The computation of the execution project time considers38
deterministic timing and, unlike our approach, RAPN is not able to model activities that utilise39
and release the same resource intermittently.40
The contributions of this paper are threefold: firstly, we review the FT concepts [2, 3] and41
propose compositional PN models for FT techniques; secondly, we propose an iterative algorithm42
to compute the number of resources that mitigate the impact of activation of faults; and thirdly, we43
propose an Integer Linear Programming Problem (ILPP) that minimises the cost of compensation44
needed for maintaining a given throughput in a FT system.45
Running example Let us consider a packet-routing algorithm inside a router where packets46
arrive and after checking source and destination of the packets, they are filtered following some47
defined rules. Figure 1 depicts a PN modelling such an algorithm. The PN marking represents the48
number nP of packets (initial marking of the process-idle place, p0), the number nT of threads49
attending the incoming packets (initial marking of p2) and the number nS of filtering-threads50
(initial marking of p7). The number nC denotes the capacity of the system. We consider that51
this number is equal to the number nP of packets, therefore place p′
0
becomes implicit and we52
omit it for analysis. Packets arrive to the router following an exponential distribution of mean53
δ0 = 5 milliseconds
1. The amount of time for checking packet headers (i.e., source, destination) is54
1We use δi as an abbreviation for δ(Ti)
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represented by transition T2, which follows an exponential distribution of mean δ2 = 2 milliseconds.55
The algorithm’s decision is represented by the place p5 and its outgoing arcs: either transition t4 is56
fired (then the packet must be discarded, which happens with a probability of 0.75), or transition57
t5 is fired. In the latter case, once some filtering-thread is available, it is used. Such a use is58
represented by T7 and takes, on average, δ7 = 1 millisecond to complete. Finally, T9 represents59
the final step of the algorithm, that consists in routing the packet(acknowledgement) properly to60
its destination(source) and takes, in terms of time, about 2 milliseconds, i.e., δ9 = 2.61
[Figure 1 about here.]62
This running example will be used henceforward to illustrate our approach. First, we will add63
to the PN depicted in Figure 1 a FT technique, and will compute the impact of faults in the64
system throughput. Then, we will apply our developed methods to compensate the throughput65
degradation.66
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces some basic concepts, such as FT67
concepts and Petri net theory. Then, Section 3 presents the proposed compositional PN models for68
FT techniques. Section 4 analyses, in first place, how conservative components are modified when69
adding the proposed PN models. It also presents the proposed iterative algorithm to compute the70
number of resources that mitigate the impact of activation of faults, and the ILPP that minimises71
the cost of compensation needed for maintaining a given throughput in a FT system. Section 572
shows a case study where both algorithms are tested. Finally, Section 6 summarises our findings73
and main contributions of this paper.74
2 Preliminary Concepts75
This section introduces some basic concepts that are needed to follow the rest of the paper. First,76
the concepts related to Fault Tolerance are introduced. Lastly, a background on Petri nets (PNs)77
and related concepts – such as upper throughput bounds – are introduced.78
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2.1 Fault Tolerance79
Fault Tolerance (FT) aims at failure avoidance carrying out error detection and system recovery [2].80
Figure 2 depicts the phases involved in a FT technique.81
[Figure 2 about here.]82
Error detection tries to identify the presence of an error in the system. It takes places either83
while the system is providing its services (concurrent), or when services are not being provided84
(preemptive). For instance, a hardware checking when the system boots up is a preemptive error85
detection technique.86
Recovery techniques are aimed at handling possible errors and/or faults in the system and87
leading it to a state without detected errors. Recovery techniques may have two steps: an error88
handling (optional step), which tries to eliminate the presence of an error in the system; and fault89
handling (mandatory step), which tries to avoid the reactivation of the detected fault.90
There are three common techniques when dealing with a detected error: rollback, when the91
system is conducted to a previous saved state (i.e., prior to error occurrence) without detected92
errors; rollforward, when the system is conducted to a new state without detected errors (in this93
case, later to error occurrence); and compensation, when there is enough redundancy to mask the94
error in the erroneous state.95
Unlike rollback or rollforward that happen on demand, compensation may happen on demand96
or systematically, independently of the presence (or absence) of an error. For instance, an example97
of a compensation handling technique triggered on demand is an exception handler mechanism. In98
this paper, we consider that error handling takes place on demand.99
The fault handling techniques that can be carried out to prevent faults from reacting again are:100
diagnosis, which records the origin (cause) of the error, locating where it happened and the type of101
error raised; isolation, which excludes (in a logical or physical way) faulty components from normal102
service delivery, so avoiding its participation in service delivery; reconfiguration, which reschedules103
service requests between non-failed components; and reinitialisation, which reconfigures the faulty104
system services by changing its configuration, stores this new configuration and reinitialises such105
affected services.106
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2.2 Petri Nets and Throughput Bounds107
This section introduces some basic concepts regarding to the class of Petri net (PN) we are con-108
sidering in this paper. Firstly, we define process Petri nets in the untimed framework. Then,109
timed Petri net systems and upper throughput bounds are defined. In the following, the reader is110
assumed to be familiar with Petri nets (see [18] for a gentle introduction).111
2.2.1 Untimed Petri Nets112
Definition 1. A Petri net [18] (PN) is a 4–tuple N = 〈P, T,Pre,Post〉, where:113
• P and T are disjoint non-empty sets of places and transitions (|P | = n, |T | = m) and114
• Pre (Post) are the pre–(post–)incidence non-negative integer matrices of size |P | × |T |.115
The pre- and post-set of a node v ∈ P∪T are respectively defined as •v = {u ∈ P∪T |(u, v) ∈ F}116
and v• = {u ∈ P ∪ T |(v, u) ∈ F}, where F ⊆ (P ×T )∪ (T ×P ) is the set of directed arcs. A Petri117
net is said to be self-loop free if ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T t ∈ •p implies t 6∈ p•. Ordinary nets are Petri nets118
whose arcs have weight 1. The incidence matrix of a Petri net is defined as C = Post−Pre.119
A vector m ∈ Z|P |≥0 which assigns a non-negative integer to each place is called marking vector120
or marking.121
Definition 2. A Petri net system, or marked Petri net S = 〈N ,m0〉, is a Petri net N with an122
initial marking m0.123
A transition t ∈ T is enabled at markingm ifm ≥ Pre(·, t), wherePre(·, t) is the column ofPre124
corresponding to transition t. A transition t enabled at m can fire yielding a new marking m′ =125
m+C(·, t) (reached marking). This is denoted bym t−→m′. A sequence of transitions σ = {ti}ni=1 is126
a firing sequence in S if there exists a sequence of markings such thatm0 t1−→m1 t2−→m2 . . . tn−→mn.127
In this case, marking mn is said to be reachable from m0 by firing σ, and this is denoted by128
m0
σ−→mn. The firing count vector σ ∈ Z|T |≥0 of the firable sequence σ is a vector such that σ(t)129
represents the number of occurrences of t ∈ T in σ. If m0 σ−→m, then we can write in vector form130
m =m0 +C · σ, which is referred to as the linear (or fundamental) state equation of the net.131
The set of markings reachable from m0 in N is denoted as RS(N ,m0) and is called the132
reachability set.133
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Two transitions t, t′ are said to be in structural conflict if they share, at least, one input place,134
i.e., •t ∩ •t′ 6= ∅. Two transitions t, t′ are said to be in effective conflict for a marking m if they135
are in structural conflict and they are both enabled atm. Two transitions t, t′ are in equal conflict136
if Pre(·, t) = Pre(·, t′) 6= 0, where 0 is a vector with all entries equal to zero.137
A transition t is live if it can be fired from every reachable marking. A marked Petri net S is138
live when every transition is live. In this paper, we assume that Ss we work with are live.139
A p-semiflow is a non-negative integer vector y ≥ 0 such that it is a left anuller of the net’s140
incidence matrix, y> · C = 0. In the sequel, we omit the transpose symbol in the matrices and141
vectors for clarity. A p-semiflow implies a token conservation law independent from any firing of142
transitions. A t-semiflow is a non-negative integer vector x ≥ 0 such that is a right anuller of the143
net’s incidence matrix, C · x = 0. A support of a vector v is defined as ‖v‖ = {i|v(i) 6= 0}. A144
p-(or t-)semiflow v is minimal when its support is not a proper superset of the support of any145
other p- (or t-)semiflow, and the greatest common divisor of its elements is one. A Petri net is said146
to be conservative (consistent) if there exists a p-semiflow (t-semiflow) which contains all places147
(transitions) in its support.148
A Petri net is said to be strongly connected if there is a directed path joining any pair of nodes of149
the net structure. A state machine is a particular type of ordinary Petri net where each transition150
has exactly one input arc and exactly one output arc, that is, |t•| = |•t| = 1, ∀t ∈ T .151
In this paper, we deal with Petri nets that model systems where resources are shared. Examples152
of this kind of systems can be found in manufacturing, logistics or web services systems. In general,153
these systems represent real-life problems where some items are processed and require the use154
of different resources (which are shared) during its processing. These systems can be naturally155
modelled in terms of process Petri nets, a subclass of Petri net whose inner structure is a strongly156
connected state machine. More formally:157
Definition 3. [5] A process Petri net (PPN) is a strongly connected self–loop free Petri net158
N = 〈P, T,Pre,Post〉 where:159
1. P = P0 ∪ PS ∪ PR is a partition such that P0 = {p0} is the process-idle place, PS 6= ∅ is the160
set of process-activity places and PR = {r1, . . . , rn}, n > 0 is the set of resources places;161
2. The subnet N ′ = 〈P0 ∪ PS , T,Pre,Post〉 is a strongly connected state machine, such that162
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every cycle contains p0.163
3. For each r ∈ PR, there exist a unique minimal p-semiflow associated to r, yr ∈ N|P |, fulfilling:164
‖yr‖ ∩ PR = {r}, ‖yr‖ ∩ PS 6= ∅, ‖yr‖ ∩ P0 = ∅ and yr(r) = 1. This establishes how each165
resource is reused, that is, they cannot be created nor destroyed.166
4. PS =
⋃
r∈PR
(‖yr‖ \ {r}). This implies that every place p ∈ PS belongs to the p-semiflow of167
at least one resource.168
Definition 3 implies that PPNs are conservative and consistent. Intuitively, Definition 3 es-169
tablishes a kind of nets where there is a process using different shared resources, every place in the170
net is covered by some p-semiflow and it uses some (at least one) resource, the number of instances171
of each resource remains constant and resources cannot change its type.172
Let N = 〈P, T,Pre,Post〉 be a PPN . A vector m0 ∈ Z|P |≥0 is called acceptable initial mark-173
ing [5] of N if: 1) m0(p) ≥ 1, p ∈ P0; 2) m0(p) = 0, ∀p ∈ PS ; and 3) m0(r) ≥ yr(r), ∀r ∈ PR,174
where m0(r) is the capacity, i.e., number of items, of the resource r and yr is the unique minimal175
p-semiflow associated to r.176
Definition 4. A process Petri net system, or marked process Petri net S = 〈N ,m0〉, is a process177
Petri net N with an acceptable initial marking m0.178
2.2.2 Timed Petri Nets179
In order to be able to use Petri nets for systems performance evaluation, the inclusion of the180
notion of time must be considered. There are two ways of introducing the notion of time in181
Petri nets, either in places or transitions. Since transitions are representing the actions of a182
system, which have associated some duration, we associate such a duration to the firing delay of183
transitions [19]. Besides, we consider that the firing delays of transitions follow an exponential184
distribution functions.185
A Petri net model where a set of exponential rates is considered (one for each transition in the186
model) is called a Stochastic Petri net (SPN) model [20,21]. These rates characterise the probability187
distribution function of the transition delay, which follow an exponential distribution function and188
are obtained as the inverse of the mean. These rates are considered to be marking-independent,189
i.e., its values are constant.190
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In this paper, we consider that the average service time of a transition t can be zero, i.e., it fires191
in zero units of time. These transitions are called immediate transitions. Otherwise, transition192
t is a timed transition. The exponential transitions are graphically represented by a white box,193
whilst immediate transitions are black boxes. It will be assumed that all transitions in conflict are194
immediate. An immediate transition t in conflict will fire with probability
r(t)∑
t′∈A r(t
′)
, where A is195
the set of enabled immediate transitions in conflict and r(t) ∈ N>0 is the routing rate associated196
to transition t. The firing of immediate transitions consumes no time. When a timed transition197
becomes enabled, it fires following an exponential distribution with mean δ(t). More formally, we198
will consider the following timed Petri net classes:199
Definition 5. A Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) [20] system is a pair 〈S, δ, r〉 where S =200
〈P, T,Pre,Post,m0〉 is a Petri net system, δ ∈ R|T |≥0 is a positive real function such that δ(t)201
is the mean of the exponential firing time distribution associated to transition t ∈ T and r ∈ N|T |>0202
is the vector of routing rates associated to transitions.203
Definition 6. A Stochastic Marked Graph (SMG) is a Stochastic Petri net whose underlying204
Petri net is a Marked Graph.205
Definition 7. A Stochastic Process Petri net (SPPN) system is a Stochastic Petri net system206
whose underlying Petri net is a Process Petri net.207
There exist different semantics for the firing of transitions, being infinite and finite server208
semantics the most frequently used. Given that infinite server semantics is more general (finite209
server semantics can be simulated by adding self-loop places), we will assume that the timed210
transitions work under infinite server semantics.211
The average marking vector, m, in an ergodic [22] Petri net system is defined as [23]:212
m(p) =
AS
lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∫ τ
0
m(p)udu (1)
where m(p)u is the marking of place p at time u and the notation =
AS
means equal almost surely.213
Similarly, the steady-state throughput, χ, in an ergodic Petri net is defined as [23]:214
χ(t) =
AS
lim
τ→∞
σ(t)τ
τ
(2)
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where σ(t)τ is the firing count of transition t at time τ .215
By definition, all the places of a SPPN are covered by p-semiflows, and therefore it is struc-216
turally bounded. In this work, we will assume that the SPPN under study is a live and structurally217
bounded net with Freely Related T-semiflows (i.e., a FRT-net) [24]. It is known that the Markov218
process that describes the time evolution [21] of these nets is ergodic [24], i.e., when the observation219
period tends to infinite, the estimated values of average marking and steady-state throughput tend220
to a certain value, what implies the existence of the above limits.221
The vector of visit ratios expresses the relative throughput of transitions in the steady state.222
The visit ratio v(t) of each transition t ∈ T normalised for transition ti , vti(t), is expressed as223
follows:224
vti(t) =
χ(t)
χ(ti)
= Γ(ti) · χ(t), ∀t ∈ T (3)
where Γ(ti) =
1
χ(ti)
represents the average inter-firing time of transition ti.225
The visit ratios of two different transitions t, t′ in equal conflict must be proportional to the226
corresponding routing rate r(t), r(t′) defining the conflict resolution condition r(t) ·vti(t′) = r(t′) ·227
vti(t). This condition can be also written in vector form as:228
R · vti = 0 (4)
where R is a matrix containing as many rows as pairs of transitions in equal conflict.229
In FRT-nets, the vector of visit ratios v exclusively depends on the structure of the net and230
on the routing rates [24]. The vector of visit ratios v normalised for transition ti, v
ti , can be231
calculated by solving the following linear system of equations [24]:232

C
R

 · vti = 0
vti(ti) = 1
(5)
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2.2.3 Performance Estimation233
A lower bound for the average inter-firing time of transition ti, Γ
lb(ti), can be computed by solving234
the following LP problem (LPP) [24]:235
Γ(ti) ≥ Γlb(ti) = maximum y ·Pre ·Dti
subject to y ·C = 0
y ·m0 = 1
y ≥ 0
(6)
where Γ(ti) is the average interfiring time of transition ti and D
ti is the vector of average service236
demands of transitions,Dti(t) = δ(t)·vti(t) (the vector of visit ratios vti is normalised for transition237
ti)
2.238
As a side product of the solution of (6), y represents the slowest p-semiflow of the system, thus239
LPP (6) can also be seen as a search for the most constraining p-semiflow. This p-semiflow will240
be the one with highest ratio
y ·Pre ·D
y ·m0 . Therefore, an upper bound Θ(ti) for the steady-state241
throughput can be calculated as the inverse of the lower bound for the average inter-firing time242
Γlb(ti), that is, Θ(ti) =
1
Γlb(ti)
.243
Let us recall that the vector of average service times of transitions δ does not depend on the244
marking. Otherwise, LPP 6 could not be applied, basically because having a δ depending on the245
marking will lead to a non-linear programming problem.246
3 Compositional PN Models for Fault Tolerance247
In this section, we provide compositional PN-based models for the Fault-Tolerant (FT) techniques248
based on the basic concepts of FT given in Section 2.1. Recall that a FT technique may involve249
both error detection – concurrent or preemptive – and recovery phases – divided in error handling250
(rollback, rollforward or compensation) and fault handling (diagnosis, isolation, reconfiguration or251
reinitialisation).252
2In the sequel, we omit the superindex ti in D
ti for clarity
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[Figure 3 about here.]253
Consider we have a system modelled with a PN in which there is an activity (represented by254
a timed transition Tf) which is subject to fail. We called it faulty transition, as it may lead to255
a fault. Before adding any FT technique to the system, we apply a transformation rule T R in256
the PN. This transformation rule allows us to apply our approach in general case, and it is not257
modifying the behaviour of the original PN model anyhow.258
Figure 3 shows how this transformation rule T R works: an immediate transition t(t′) and place259
•Tf(T
•
f ) are added just from(to) transition Tf , and all input(output) places of transition Tf are260
accordingly connected to transition t(t′).261
[Figure 4 about here.]262
Figure 4 depicts the interaction between a PN that models the behaviour of a given system263
and a PN that models a FT technique. A PN-based FT model is subdivided in Error Detection264
and Recovery sub-models. Each sub-model respectively represents the phases involved in a FT265
technique. In the sequel, we explain each model and its interactions in detail.266
3.1 PN Error Detection Model267
Figure 5(a) depicts the PN model for error detection. The timed transition Tdetect represents268
how long the error detection activity takes. Note that this transition is abstracting the behaviour269
for detecting an error, so that it may be refined into a more complex model representing error270
detection in more detail (Detection phase in Figure 5(a)). After error detection activity takes271
place, the presence of an error is discriminated. When an error arises (transition terr), then a272
token is put on place p|eed. Otherwise, a token is put on place p|ned.273
The integration between the Error Detection model and the System model is done through274
labelled places p|sed, p|eed (a labelled place p is defined as p|label). We have followed the compo-275
sitional rules over the places defined in [25, 26] to combine models using labelled places: pairs of276
places with matching labels are superposed. Figure 5(a) depicts the places p|sed, p|ned added to the277
system model. The origin of the incoming arc of place p|sed depends on the type of error detection,278
and synchronises the execution of error detection model with the system model: when concurrent,279
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the arc added is the red-dashed one; otherwise (preemptive), the green-dotted arc is considered.280
Note that the place p|ned is synchronised with T •f (which is added to the system by transformation281
rule T R).282
[Figure 5 about here.]283
This simple model allows us to represent the most common error detection techniques, e.g., to284
validate input data, or intermediate data generated and reused during faulty transition (it can be285
concurrently done), and to validate output after faulty transition execution (preemptive).286
3.2 PN Recovery Model287
Recovery phase involves two steps, a first (optional) step of error handling (rollback, rollforward or288
compensation) and a second one of fault handling technique (diagnosis, isolation, reconfiguration289
or reinitialisation).290
Following the definitions given in [2], we have grouped the fault handling techniques in two291
groups: diagnosis and reinitialisation techniques; and isolation and reconfiguration. This decision292
is based on the abstracted behaviour of these techniques, as we explain henceforward. We have293
composed models that represent valid combinations of the recovery phase as it is shown in Table 1.294
This classification is made based on how the techniques work. For instance, we believe that a295
rollforward technnique cannot be combined with reconfiguration or reinitialisation, because recon-296
figuration switches the request to spare components, while reinitialisation updates and records a297
new system configuration. Thus, we consider that to move to a future correct state after recovering298
is unmeaning.299
[Table 1 about here.]300
Figure 6(a) shows the PN model of diagnosis and reinitialisation FT recovery techniques. Place301
p|eed is superposed with the one of Error Detection model, and place p|T•
f
is superposed with302
place T •f in the system model. A token in place p|eed indicates that an error has been detected.303
Once transition trm is fired, a (optional) compensation activity may take place (Compensation304
phase). Then, recovery activity takes place (abstracted in Recovery phase). As in the previous305
model of error detection, we have represented compensation and recovery phases as a single timed306
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transitions (Tc and Trec, respectively). These transitions may be refined into a more complex307
models representing compensation and recovery activities in more detail.308
Finally, the token flow is redirected through place p|rtn. The superposition of this place depends309
on the error handling technique used: it will be a place which becomes eventually marked after310
the faulty transition Tf is fired (rollforward), or which was eventually marked before its firing311
(rollback). In both cases and to keep conservativeness of the model, place p|rtn must belong to the312
p-semiflow associated to the resource r (we called it faulty resource), being r the inner resource313
used by faulty activity. Although a transition Tf can represent an activity where several resources314
are being used, for the sake of simplicity in this paper we assume that the fault is caused by the315
use of the inner resource (i.e., the last one acquired). Otherwise, note that after recovering phase316
other resources acquired after faulty resource should be released to keep conservativeness.317
The difference between diagnosis and reinitialisation technique can be established by the du-318
ration of recovery phase. For instance, when diagnosis technique is considered, the recovery phase319
will have a much lower duration than when reinitialisation is taken into account due to the actions320
that are performed.321
[Figure 6 about here.]322
Figure 6(b) shows the PN model of isolation and reconfiguration FT recovery techniques. This323
case is identical to the previous until the (optional) compensation phase. After the compensation324
phase takes place, the type of the fault is discriminated [2] as intermittent (that is, the fault is325
transient) or solid (i.e., the faults whose activation is reproducible). When the fault is intermittent,326
as proposed in [2], normal execution can keep going on and token is returned to place p|rtn (as327
before, the superposed place depends on the type of error detection). On the contrary, when a328
solid fault is detected, the faulty resource is excluded from normal service delivery – as indicated329
by both isolation and reconfiguration techniques – and the token is moved to the place p|safe. We330
assume that place p|safe is superposed with the place previous to acquire the faulty resource r,331
i.e., p|safe = •tacq, where tacq is the transition where faulty resource r is acquired.332
In the case of isolation and reconfiguration, the recovery phase is called Maintenance phase,333
because it involves the participation of an external agent [2]. We have modelled maintenance334
phase as a single transition TMTTR that represents the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) spent on335
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fixing the faulty resource. As in the previous case, this model can be refined to a more complex336
maintenance model. Anyhow, after maintenance phase takes place the fixed resource is returned337
to place p|ir, which is superposed to the resource place pr.338
As in the previous techniques, the difference between isolation and reconfiguration technique339
can be established by the duration of maintenance phase. For instance, when isolation technique340
is considered, the maintenance phase will have a much greater duration than when reconfiguration341
is taken into account.342
Finally, note that most of the FT techniques can be modelled with the proposed models. For343
instance, a watchdog can be modelled as a reconfiguration FT technique with concurrent error344
detection and rollforward (or rollback), and a checkpointing and rollback can be modelled as a345
reinitialisation FT technique. Unfortunately, other FT techniques, such as n-version programming346
or combined proactive-reactive techniques [27] cannot be adapted to the proposed model and some347
tweaks must be done. We aim to extend these models to cover all FT techniques as a future work.348
[Figure 7 about here.]349
Recall the PN of the running example depicted in Figure 1. Suppose that the filtering activity350
may fail, i.e., the faulty transition is T7. The router manufacturer is interested in adding a watchdog351
(recall it can be modelled as a reconfiguration FT technique) into the algorithm such that the352
threads that fail (they are hanged) are discarded, and they are cleaned with a fixed internal timer.353
In this case, the error detection model is concurrent, as the failure can be detected during normal354
operation; and the error handling technique used is rollback: when an error is detected, the packet355
is filtered by another thread, when available.356
The resulting PN after adding the FT technique described above is depicted in Figure 7. We357
assume that the detection activity takes, on average, δdetect = 0.5 milliseconds, and the recovery358
activity takes, on average, δMTTR = 2 seconds. Let us suppose a probability of raising an error359
of 0.2, resulting the 5% of the times in a solid fault. This PN will be used in the next section for360
sensitive performability analysis.361
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4 Analysis of PN-based FT Models362
This section introduces, in first place, how the conservative components (i.e., the p-semiflows) are363
modified when FT models are added to a PPN . Then, we perform a sensitive analysis on upper364
throughput bound of the PPN system with respect to the failure probabilities. Lastly, we propose365
an optimisation technique that tries to compensate the throughput degradation produced by the366
existence of faults.367
4.1 Conservative Components368
Let us analyse how minimal p-semiflows are modified. The addition of the proposed FT models369
transforms each p-semiflow yr associated to a resource r that makes use of the faulty transition tf370
(i.e, ‖yr‖∩{•tf , t•f} 6= ∅) into two p-semiflows y′r,y′′r ,y′r 6= y′′r such that ‖yr‖ ⊂ ‖y′r‖, ‖yr‖ ⊂ ‖y′′r‖.371
This transformation is due to the fact that FT models consume/produce tokens from/to the original372
p-semiflows. These p-semiflows cover all places added by the FT technique, thus the net remains373
conservative.374
[Table 2 about here.]375
For instance, the minimal initial p-semiflows of the net in Figure 1 are: y1 =376
{p0, p1, p3, p4, p5, p6|safe, p8|rtn, p9, p10, p11}, y2 = {p2, p3, p4, p5, p6|safe, p8|rtn, p9, p10, p11} and377
y3 = {p7|ir, p8|rtn, p9}. The minimal p-semiflows of the PN in Figure 1 that contain places from/to378
transition T7 (p8|rtn and p9, respectively) are y1,y2 and y3. Thus, the new p-semiflows of PN in379
Figure 7 are the ones showed in Table 2.380
Note that these new p-semiflows violate the third property of definition of PPN (see Section 2),381
given that there exist more than a single minimal p-semiflow containing the same resource, e.g.,382
y′
2
and y′′
2
contain the resource place p2 on its support. Nevertheless, in the new net system it still383
holds that each minimal p-semiflow contains only one initially marked place.384
4.2 Sensitive Analysis of Upper Throughput Bounds385
As we have seen in the previous section, the p-semiflows of the PPN change once some of the386
proposal FT models are added. Recall that an upper throughput bound Θ of a PPN system is387
16
Rodr´ıguez et al. Journal of Risk and Reliability 0(0)
related to the slowest p-semiflow y, i.e., Θ =
y ·m0
y ·Pre ·D .388
Given that in the considered nets all the components of minimal p-semiflows are equal to 1389
and the only initially marked places are resource places, i.e., ∀p ∈ ‖yr‖ \ {r},m0(p) = 0, the390
previous equation can be written as Θ =
m0(r)
yr ·Pre ·D where yr is minimal. Let us assume that391
after adding some FT technique, there are n minimal p-semiflows, y1, . . . ,yn that are modified.392
Thus, the throughput bound of the new net system is:393
Θ′ = minimum(Θ,minimumni=1
m0(ri)
yi ·Pre ·D ) (7)
where yi is a minimal p-semiflow, i.e., ∀p ∈ ‖y‖,y(p) = 1.394
Recall the running example of the previous section. Suppose an initial marking of nP = 10,395
nT = 2 and nS = 2. The slowest p-semiflow is, with this configuration and before adding the396
FT technique (Figure 1), y = {p2, p3, p4, p5, p6|safe, p8|rtn, p9, p10, p11}; and the upper throughput397
bound is Θ = 0.470588. After adding the proposed FT technique, the equations
m0(ri)
yi ·Pre ·D398
related to p-semiflows that change are:399
y′
1
→ m0(p0)
δ0 · v0 + δ2 · v2 + δ7 · v7 + δ9 · v9
y′′
1
→ m0(p0)
δ0 · v0 + δ2 · v2 + δdetect · vdetect + δ9 · v9
y′
2
→ m0(p2)
δ2 · v2 + δ7 · v7 + δ9 · v9
y′′
2
→ m0(p0)
δ2 · v2 + δdetect · vdetect + δ9 · v9
y′
3
→ m0(p2)
δ7 · v7 + δMTTR · vMTTR
y′′
3
→ m0(p0)
δdetect · vdetect + δMTTR · vMTTR
(8)
Note that as error detection is concurrent, there is no p-semiflow containing both faulty tran-400
sition and error detection transition at the same time. Otherwise, the faulty transition appears401
in conjunction with error detection transition in all p-semiflows generated. Besides, in the case402
of concurrent error detection, the number of minimal p-semiflows to be checked can be simpli-403
fied, taking only the generated one that it is max(δdetect, δTf ). Thus, the p-semiflows of interest404
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here are: y′
1
, y′
2
and y′
3
(as δ7 > δdetect). The throughputs of these p-semiflows are, respectively,405
Θ1 = 1.073825, Θ2 = 0.463768 and Θ3 = 0.304762.406
Therefore, the new slowest p-semiflow is y′
3
, and the new upper throughput bound is Θ′ = Θ3 =407
0.304762. That is, with the described configuration, the addition of an isolation FT technique408
causes a degradation of 35.23% to the upper throughput bound of the system.409
We have performed a sensitive analysis of Θ1,Θ2 and Θ3 with respect to the probability of410
errors re, re ∈ [0 . . . 1], taking steps of 0.01. The results are plotted in Figure 8(a). The solid line411
is Θ, the upper throughput bound of the original system. The dotted line is Θ1, while dot-dashed412
is Θ2 and dashed line is Θ3.413
[Figure 8 about here.]414
The findings show that Θ2 is a bit lower than the original upper throughput bound for low415
probabilities of error. This holds until the probability of error reaches a value near to 0.14. From416
that point, Θ3 becomes the new upper throughput bound, which besides exponentially decreases.417
It is remarkable that y′
3
, i.e., the p-semiflow associated to Θ3, is even faster than the others for418
low probabilities of error (re < 0.06). Lastly, when probability of error reaches a value near to 0.8,419
the throughput of all minimal p-semiflows quickly decreases and tends to zero.420
4.3 Resource Assignment421
This section introduces an iterative strategy that computes the number of resources needed to422
maintain a given upper throughput bound in a degradable system where our proposed FT models423
are added.424
Such a strategy is presented in Algorithm 1. As input, it needs the description of the PN model425
with the FT techniques added to it with the initial marking and the vector of service times of426
transitions, 〈N ,m0, δ〉; the upper throughput bound Θ before adding the FT techniques; and the427
set YFT of minimal p-semiflows that are modified after adding the FT techniques. As output,428
it returns the initial marking m′0 such that the upper throughput bound Θ
′ of the FT system is429
greater than or equal than Θ.430
Algorithm 1 works as follows. It iterates in the content of the set YFT of minimal p-semiflows431
that have been modified when adding a proposed FT model. For each minimal p-semiflow yi ∈432
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Algorithm 1 An iterative algorithm to compute initial marking needed to maintain a certain
upper throughput bound with a probability of error.
Input: 〈N ,m0, δ〉, Θ, YFT
Output: m′0
1: m′
0
=m0
2: for each yi ∈ YFT do
3: m′
0
(ri) = maximum(m0(ri), d(yi ·Pre ·D) ·Θe)
4: end for each
YFT , the value of the initial marking for associated resource ri is computed as the maximum of433
the previous initial marking of the resource (i.e., m0(ri)) or the d(yi ·Pre ·D) · Θe. The latter434
equation comes from solving Θ =
m0(ri)
yi ·Pre ·D . The ceiling is needed because m
′
0(ri) ∈ N.435
Let us apply the Algorithm 1 in the running example. The previous upper throughput bound436
is Θ = 0.470588, and the set of minimal p-semiflows that are modified after adding isolation437
FT is YFT = {y′
1
,y′
2
,y′
3
}. For a given initial marking m0(p0) = 10,m0(p2) = 2,m0(p7) = 2,438
Algorithm 1 returns as solution: m′
0
(p0) = m0(p0) = 10,m
′
0
(p2) = 3,m
′
0
(p7) = 4. That is, it is439
needed another thread and two more filtering-threads to compensate a 20% of errors (and a 5% of440
them deriving in solid faults) using reconfiguration as FT technique.441
We have plotted in Figure 8(b) the initial marking needed to support the given throughput of442
Θ = 0.470588 varying the probability of error re, re ∈ [0 . . . 1], taking steps of 0.01. The dotted443
line is the initial number of tokens of p0 (packets, nP ), the solid line corresponds to the initial444
number of tokens of p2 (threads, nT ) and the dashed line is the initial number of tokens of p7445
(filtering-threads, nS). The results show that the number of packets and threads remain more446
or less equal, i.e., there is no need to increment too much units to be able to maintain the given447
throughput, even with high probability of errors. However, the number of filtering-threads needed448
increases rapidly with respect to the probability of error.449
4.4 Minimising Cost of Compensating Throughput Degradation450
In this section, we present an Integer-Linear Programming Problem (ILPP) that minimises the451
cost of compensating throughput degradation caused by the presence of errors.452
We are able to compute the initial marking needed to maintain a given throughput with the453
previous Algorithm 1. However, the increment of items of resources can have a cost in real systems454
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and we may not be able to increment as much as it is desired. Recall that equation
m0(ri)
yi ·Pre ·D455
relates not only the number of items of resources (m0(ri)) but also activity timings and error456
(and solid faults) probabilities (D). If we consider a given error probability re and solid faults457
probability rs, a compensation may be done in two ways: either the number of resources in the458
system can be incremented, or the timing of FT activities (detection, compensation and recovery459
phases) can be decremented. Both ways can have some cost associated.460
Let us assume that FT phases are abstracted in single timed transition, i.e., a FT technique461
j adds to the system three timed transition: T jdetect (detection phase), T
j
c (compensation phase)462
and T jrec/T
j
MTTR (recovery/maintenance phase). Let c
r
i the cost of an increment of one unit of the463
resource ri, and c
d
j the cost of a decrement of one unit of time of detection phase of FT technique j,464
while ccj(c
rm
j ) is the cost of a decrement of one unit of time of compensation(recovery/maintenance)465
phase.466
We can build an Integer-Linear Programming Problem (ILPP) to compute the minimum cost467
that guarantees a compensation of the throughput system after adding a number m of FT tech-468
niques as follows:469
minimum

 n∑
i=1
cri · αi +
m∑
j=1
(
cdj · βdj + ccj · βcj + crmj · βrmj
)

 subject to
m0(ri) + αi ≥ Θ · yi ·Pre ·D′
δ′(T jdetect) = δ(T
j
detect)− βdj
δ′(T jc ) = δ(T
j
c )− βcj (9)
δ′(T jrec) = δ(T
j
rec)− βrmj
δ′(t) ≥ δmin(t), ∀t ∈ T
αi, β
d
j , β
c
j , β
rm
j ≥ 0, αi ∈ N, ∀i ∈ [1 . . . n], ∀j ∈ [1 . . .m]
where n p-semiflows have been modified by the addition ofm FT techniques to the original system;470
D′(t) = δ′(t) · v(t), ∀t ∈ T ; and δmin(t) is a lower bound for the service time of transition t (that471
is, we impose a minimum service time for transitions). The new number of resources and firing of472
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transitions will be given by the values of αi, β
d
j , β
c
j , β
rm
j , respectively.473
This ILPP is applied to the case study in the next section.474
5 Case Study: a Secure Database System475
This section introduces a case study to test our approach. We have considered the design of476
a Secure Database System (SDBS) deployed as a Web Service that stores confidential data and477
keeps traceability of all operations made over the data. Examples of this kind of system are a478
medical insurance company (that keeps customer’s medical data), or a bank company (that keeps479
customer’s balance accounts).480
The UML-Sequence Diagram in Figure 9 models how SDBS works when a user requests an481
operation on its stored data (for instance, a bank customer asks for all operations made on its482
bank accounts). When a new request arrives at the system (attended by WS-Requester), it asks483
for a security token that is provided by WS-SecurityToken. Once it is provided, the request is484
accordingly encrypted and set to WS-PolicyService, where it is validated, decrypted and trans-485
mitted to WS-Coordinator. Finally, WS-Coordinator unpacks the request and sends it to the486
WS-Application, which accesses the database through WS-DBApplication service via a secure in-487
tranet. An acknowledgement is sent back through the system to the origin of the request, reporting488
the results to the user. Note that the result also needs a security token to be securely transmitted489
back to the user.490
[Figure 9 about here.]491
Figure 10 depicts the Petri net (PN) corresponding to the behaviour of the SDBS sys-492
tem described in Figure 9. The transformation from UML to PN is documented in [28],493
and can be carried out by several tools, such as ArgoPN, ArgoPerformance [28] or Ar-494
goSPE [29]. Each resource is represented by a dark grey place in the PN: p2 (WS-Requester),495
p5 (WS-PolicyService), p13 (WS-SecurityToken), p24 (WS-Coordinator), p29 (WS-Application)496
and p32 (WS-DBApplication); while user’s requests are represented by the process-idle place p0497
(depicted in light grey). As the running example, we consider that there is a place p′
0
with the498
same initial marking that p0, thus it becomes implicit and it is not considered for the analysis499
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(indeed, we omitted it in the Figure 10). The number of instances of each resource is summarised500
in Table 3(b), and they will be represented by tokens in the respective place. Due to the state501
explosion problem the computation of the number of states with this configuration using different502
tools (e.g. PeabraiN [30] or GreatSPN [31]) has not been possible in reasonable time in a Intel503
Pentium IV 3.6GHz with 3GiB RAM DDR2 533MHz host machine.504
The acquire (release) of a resource is represented by an immediate transition with an input (out-505
put) arc. For example, transition t2 represents the reception of the request by the WS-Requester506
service, while t7 represents the release of such a resource.507
[Figure 10 about here.]508
[Table 3 about here.]509
Consider that transition that represents an operation on data after reading the DB, T31, may510
fail with a probability of 0.15. We decide to add a reinitialisation FT technique FT 1, without511
compensation phase and with a concurrent error detection that takes, on average, δ(T 1detect) =512
0.5ms. The recovery time, i.e., the time needed for reconfiguring DB service takes, on average,513
δ(T 1rec) = 20ms. Lastly, place p36 (the one before faulty transition T31) is labelled as p36|rtn.514
The upper throughput bound of the system is, before adding the FT technique, Θ = 1.481481,515
and it is associated to the minimal p-semiflow of p32 – i.e., WS-DBApplication. When adding the516
FT technique described, the minimal p-semiflows that are modified correspond to the ones that517
use T31, i.e., yp0 ,yp2 , yp29 and yp32 , and the upper throughput bound decreases near to a 133.98%,518
that is, Θ′ = 0.633147 and it is related as well to WS-DBApplication.519
Let us apply now Algorithm 1 to compute the initial marking needed to compensate the through-520
put degradation. The minimal p-semiflows under study here are: y′p0 = yp0 ∪{•T31, T •31, p14},y′p2 =521
yp2 ∪ {•T31, T •31, p14},y′p29 = yp29 ∪ {•T31, T •31, p14},y′p31 = yp31 ∪ {•T31, T •31, p14} (the other p-522
semiflows y′′p0 ,y
′′
p2
,y′′p29 ,y
′′
p31
are not of interest due to δdetect <= δ31). The computation of value of523
y1pi ·Pre ·D is, respectively, 41.9520, 41.6557, 10.3965, 9.3594. Thus, the solution of Algorithm 1 is524
m′
0
(p0) = 100,m
′
0
(p2) = 50,m
′
0
(p29) = 11,m
′
0
(p31) = 10. That is, the number of WS-Application525
(p29) and WS-DBApplication (p31) must be incremented to 11 and 10 units, respectively, to main-526
tain the given throughput of Θ = 1.481481 and a probability of error of 0.15. If resources are527
incremented as it is given by the solution of this algorithm, the new upper throughput bound has528
22
Rodr´ıguez et al. Journal of Risk and Reliability 0(0)
a value of Θ′ = 1.567476.529
Let us consider that the addition of new resources has some associated cost, more precisely, the530
cost of adding new instances of any host service is $350 each (for instance, because new licenses531
for deploying more virtual servers must be purchased). In the case of recovery method, it can be532
improved having a cost, on average, of $250 per each millisecond, and the minimum required time533
for recovering is 5ms (i.e., δmin(Trec) = 5ms).534
With this configuration, we apply now the proposal ILPP (10) for computing the minimal cost535
that compensate a probability of error of 0.15. The result of applying ILPP (10) is that 4 more536
resources of WS-Application (p29), 5 more resources of WS-DBApplication (p32) and recovery537
time must be decremented in 2ms. The cost associated to these actions is $3, 650. After applying538
these changes, the upper throughput bound is Θ′′ = 1.500441, which represents an improvement539
near to 1.28% of the previous upper throughput bound Θ.540
Note that as the number of resources and the timing must be natural numbers, we will always541
obtain an upper throughput bound in the FT system where results of ILPP (10) are applied542
(slightly) better than in the original system model.543
In summary, the solution of Algorithm (10) has an associated cost of $3, 850, because 11 more544
resources must be added, whilst the solution giving by minimising cost through ILPP (10) costs545
$3, 650.546
6 Conclusions547
Software systems are usually subject to faults that may lead to the existence of error and failures.548
Normally, Fault-Tolerant (FT) techniques are incorporated to these systems (then called FT sys-549
tems) to mitigate the impact of activations of faults. FT systems can be naturally modelled as550
Discrete Event Systems (DES) where sharing resources are used.551
In this paper, firstly we have provided compositional models for FT techniques that allow552
us to make performability ( i.e., performance under failure conditions) analysis easier when FT553
parameters change. Thus, these FT models can be useful for evaluating different FT approaches554
in the same system model. Secondly, we have presented an iterative algorithm that computes the555
initial marking needed to maintain a given upper throughput bound in a system model within our556
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proposed FT models. Thirdly, we present an Integer-Linear Programming Problem (ILPP) that557
minimises the cost of compensating throughput degradation caused by the presence of faults and558
errors). The use of linear programming techniques guarantees its efficiency and scalability to large559
models. Both algorithms are applied to a process Petri net modelling a Secure Database System.560
This paper provides upper throughput bounds for the kind of systems under study since upper561
throughput bounds are usually closer to the real system throughput [24, 32]. The work here562
presented is a starting point, and as future work, we aim at analysing lower throughput bounds563
following the same methodology. The lower throughput bounds would enhance the throughput564
analysis under failure, as an interval for the throughput would be provided.565
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Figure 1: Petri net representation of a packet-routing algorithm.
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Figure 2: Phases involved on a Fault-Tolerant technique (adapted from [2]).
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(a) Original model (b) Transformed model
Figure 3: Transformation rule T R of a transition tf subject to fail (faulty transition).
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Figure 4: Integration between a PN-based system model and a PN-based FT technique.
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(a) Error Detection model
(b) Places p|sed, p|ned added to the system model
Figure 5: PN-based model of Error Detection and faulty activity inside the system.
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(a) Diagnosis & reinitialisation
(b) Isolation & reconfiguration
Figure 6: PN-based models of Recovery model: (a) and (b) isolation & reconfiguration.
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Figure 7: Petri net representation of the packet-routing algorithm depicted in Figure 1 extended
with a FT technique.
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Figure 8: Results of (a) throughput values and (b) initial marking with respect to probability of
error.
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Figure 9: SDBS Request Customer’s Data scenario.
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Figure 10: Petri net of the SDBS. Resource places are depicted in dark grey, whilst process-idle
place in light grey.
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Rollforward Rollbackward
(& compensation)∗ (& compensation)∗
Diagnosis
√ √
Isolation
√ √
Reconfiguration X
√
Reinitialisation X
√
Table 1: Valid combinations of error handling and fault handling techniques. The symbol ∗ means
optional.
41
Rodr´ıguez et al. Journal of Risk and Reliability 0(0)
y′1 = y1 ∪ {•T7, T •7 , p14}
y′′
1
= y1 ∪ {p1|sed, p12, p13, p1|eed, p14}
y′2 = y2 ∪ {•T7, T •7 , p14}
y′′2 = y2 ∪ {p1|sed, p12, p13, p1|eed, p14}
y′
3
= y3 ∪ {•T7, T •7 , p14, p15}
y′′3 = y3 ∪ {p1|sed, p12, p13, p1|eed, p14, p15}
Table 2: New p-semiflows of the PN in Figure 7.
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Transition Method Value(s)
T0 newAccess() 0.2ms
T2, T8, T10, T49 $delayNet 2.5ms
T13, T16, T19, T23, $intranetLag 0.2ms
T36, T41, T46
T26, T29, T32, T34 $secIntraLag 0.5ms
T4, T43 initProcessing() 1ms
T5, T44 unpack&validate() 0.1ms
T6, T45 generateToken() 0.5ms
T9, T48 sign&encrypt() 0.8ms
T12 initialise() 0.3ms
T15, T22, T52 validate() 0.3ms
T18, T54 decrypt() 1ms
T28, T33 DBread() 0.2ms
T30 checkParams() 0.6ms
T31 doOperation() 0.2ms
T39 parseOutputFormat() 0.3ms
T40 pack() 0.1ms
T55 display() 1.5ms
(a) Activity times
Place Meaning Value(s)
p0 No. users 100
p2 No. request capacity 50
p5 No. security hosts 25
p13 No. policy hosts 10
p24 No. coordinator hosts 10
p29 No. application hosts 6
p32 No. DB hosts 4
(b) Initial number (no.) of resources
Table 3: Experiments parameters.
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